In this paper we analyze empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question we consider a series of static models and a dynamic model of market share development. We find a clear early mover advantage, mainly caused by the influence of the penetration rate: it pays to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile telephone. Another important determining factor is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is significantly easier to enter a highly concentrated industry. Finally, there are important differences between countries possibly indicating the relative strength of the national regulators. For example, it turns out that it is relatively difficult to enter the mobile telephony sector and gain market share in the Scandinavian countries.
1 The data used for this research are based on the Global Mobile Subscriber Database (GMSD) of the Informa Group. The data are provided to us by Proximus (Belgacom Mobile) for whom we carried out a research assignment. The results reported here are a revised version of the research for Proximus. We are very grateful to Proximus for letting us use these data and report these results to a wider audience. Bijwaard's research is partly supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
Introduction
The idea that in an industry firms may have a first-mover advantage exists in the economics literature for many, many years. Von Stackelberg, for example, showed already in 1934 that in the context of quantity-setting firms a leader (first-mover) is able to get a larger market share and higher profits than a follower (second-mover).
There are several reasons why first-mover advantages may arise. 2 In the economics (see, e.g., Mueller (1997) ) and strategic management (see, e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) ) literature the following factors are mentioned where a distinction is made between factors working on the supply and the demand side. On the demand side, there is the pre-dominant importance of switching cost (Klemperer, 1987a,b) . Switching costs can arise (i) from the fact that consumers have to make some initial investment in adapting to a seller's product or services, (ii) from firmspecific learning on how to use the product (habit formation), or (iii) because of contractual costs imposed by the firm. With switching costs, firms that already exist in the market when consumers still have to make their first choice benefit as later firms have to offer much better deals to convince consumers to switch. Other sources for first-mover advantage on the demand side include network externalities and uncertainty about the quality other firms offer (Schmalensee, 1981) . On the supply side, there are similar factors working to the advantage of early entrants in the market, most notably sunk costs and economies of scale (Schmalensee, 1982) and cost efficiencies through learning by doing.
There is also a considerable amount of empirical literature on first-mover advantages, mostly in management and marketing journals (see, e.g., Urban et al., 1986 , Kalyanaram and Urban, 1992 for an overview). Typically, this literature studies how market shares at a particular moment in time depend on the firm's position in entering the market: what is the typical (long-run) market share of the pioneer firm, the second entrant, etc.? These studies are based on cross-sectional data from many different markets. Kalyanaram and Urban (1992) are the first to study a combination of cross-section data and time series. They also consider the impact of factors such as price differences, relative advertising expenditures, relative quality perception, etc. on the development of market shares. Their model allows a comparison in the rate of convergence to an asymptotic market share level by later entrants. Pioneering advantage is also related to the time a firm (or brand) is in the market. Longer lead time, which is the time between entries, should increase this advantage. Two papers by Huff and Robinson (1994) and Brown and Lattin (1994) confirm this for frequently purchased consumer goods and show that the pioneering advantage declines over time with competition. An overview of earlier and later studies can be found in Montgomery (1988, 1998) and in .
The vast majority of empirical studies finds that market pioneers have substantially higher market shares than later entrants. This strong association between order of entry and market share is questioned by some authors (e.g. Golder and Tellis (1993) ).
They argue that most of the empirical studies have potential limitations. One such a limitation is the fact that entry is usually treated as an exogenous parameter, whereas timing of entry of a firm might be a choice variable that depends on the perceived market expectations after entry. Moore et al. (1991) extended the Robinson and Fornell (1985) model to allow for the possibility that market entry is endogenous.
This paper studies whether early entrants in the European mobile telephony sector have benefited through a long-term larger market share from their pioneering activities. The paper makes three types of contributions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying the consequences of the order of entry using data from one particular sector where consumers buy infrequently. A disadvantage of traditional cross-section analysis is the potentially large differences between sectors in the data set. Ideally, one would like to have a (large) number of entrants in one or similar market(s). There are not many cases where such conditions apply. European telecommunication in the 1990s is an exception. In the 1990s telephone services were liberalized in many European countries and with the advent of mobile telephony more and more operators entered the different markets over time.
The problem of endogeneity pointed at above does not arise in our case as the timing of entry can (to a large extent) be considered an exogenous variable due to the fact that firms can only enter the market at times the government was willing to sell additional licenses. The data set we use is unique in the sense that it contains monthly data about market shares in all Western European countries. In the next section, where we describe the data we used for this study in more detail, it will become clear that there are 46 market introductions in this period and that the development of the telecom sectors in the different countries is quite similar to each other. The telecom sector in the 1990s is therefore an ideal case to consider empirically the impact of the timing of entry into a market.
Second, from a policy perspective, the mobile telephony sector has attracted quite a bit of attention. Competition authorities and regulators have tried to ensure that the interests of entrants are well taken care of. A consistent empirical investigation of the success or failure of this policy has, however, been lacking up to this point. We will study in detail how the order of entry has co-determined how the market shares of firms have evolved over time in different countries. Third, because of the nature of our data set, we are able to estimate whether there are systematic differences between the way market shares of entrants develop in different European countries. Therefore, we can answer the question in which countries it is more and less difficult for entrants to enter the mobile telephony market.
The questions we are interested in are the following. What are the main success factors determining the growth in market shares of entrants? In particular, what is the impact of (the growth in) market penetration, measured as the percentage of the population that already has a mobile telephone; and what is the impact of factors such as the number of incumbents and the market concentration at the moment of entry?
The main empirical studies we know of the European Telecommunications industry are the two papers by Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) . These papers study a related, but very different question, namely whether the diffusion rate of mobile telephones in a country depends on the degree of competition. They find that that such a positive relationship exists, but that it is relatively weak compared to the national differences in diffusion speed. 
The European Mobile Telephony Markets
In the beginning of the 1990s, most European countries had one incumbent firm offering telephone services to the population. 3 Mobile telephony was at its infancy. National regulators were given the task to force incumbent companies to allow other firms access to their fixed network (under the so-called essential facilities doctrine) and also to look after the fact that in the mobile telephony sector two-way access was granted so that subscribers to one network could easily call subscribers to other networks at fair prices (see, e.g., Cave et al., 2002) . One of the goals the national governments had set for the mobile telephony sector was to create a situation where firms with their own network could compete with one another so that the regulation problem of creating access to the fixed telephony network of the incumbent firm would not arise. Apart from firms with their own network, nowadays most countries 3 France and the U.K. had already two mobile operators in 1990; Greece had none. In Greece and the UK, two firms started simultaneously, so in these two countries there were two incumbent firms. In UK: BT and Vodafone started both in January 1985. In Greece: TIM and Vodafone started both in July 1993.
also have active mobile virtual operators that roam on the network of others to offer their services to clients.
When the market for mobile telephony services gradually took off (see also Figure 1 ), it were primarily businesses that formed the clientele. Consumers entered the market only more towards the end of the 1990s in most countries. The start-up of consumer markets has lead to a dramatic increase in the penetration rate around the turn of the millennium. The agents on the demand side that create, however, the largest telephone traffic (the businesses) usually chose to buy their mobile telephony services from the incumbent parties or the very early entrants. Moreover, later entrants 4 needed time to build a reliable network with country-wide coverage, creating temporary quality differences at the time the later entrants entered the market.
Switching costs and network effects may explain early entrants dominance in the mobile telephony markets in the following way. Switching cost arise in several ways.
First, for a long time firms were able to prevent number portability so that consumers could not continue to use their "own" telephone number when switching firms. The time and effort it takes to inform friends or business relations of the change in number is a considerable switching cost, certainly for the larger users. In most countries, national regulators were able to enforce number portability in recent years, so that this type of switching costs does not exist anymore. However, other forms of switching costs continue to be prevalent, most notably the terms of the subscription contracts (one to two years) and the time it takes to adapt to a firm's services. Because of the switching costs, one may expect that there is a premium to entering the market when the penetration rate is still low.
Network effects prevail for two reasons. First, on the supply side the sector's technology is one with large fixed costs (the cost of creating and maintaining a network) and very small marginal costs. Hence, if all firms are equally efficient, the firm with the largest market share has the lowest average cost. This firm therefore may price below its competitors thereby further increasing its market share. A larger firm also has more possibilities to invest in its network thereby offering a more reliable service. A second source of network effects arises in some countries where firms are allowed to charge different prices for calls terminating on their own network and calls terminating on the network of others. This pricing strategy may induce consumers to subscribe to the firm where most friends are also subscribed to.
Description of the data
In this subsection we describe the data we used for our analysis. We have selected the following sixteen European countries to work with: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, figures. This has been done for both the penetration rate and for the market shares.
Details on the data on penetration rates and markets shares and the interpolation methodology used, will be discussed below.
Penetration rate
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Figure 1. Development of penetration rate in different countries
The picture suggests that the development of the penetration rate over time follows the familiar S-curve (see also Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) for the European Mobile Telephony Markets). It also shows that the development in each country follows a very similar pattern. The missing monthly data over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] are therefore for each country and each successive year interpolated on the basis of this curve (or logistic approach).
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Market shares
For each entrant we have analyzed how its market share develops over time, from the moment of introduction onwards. 7 The developments in market shares measured in this way are depicted in Figure 2 . One can easily see that an average firm's market share increases most steeply immediately after entering the market. Moreover, a rough first impression suggests that the increase in market shares flattens off to become more or less stable after approximately 40 months after entry. The figure also
shows that one entrant has been particularly successful. This is the Greek firm definition, to be equal to 1 we interpolate the market shares indirectly, namely by interpolating the number of subscribers of an operator. From the number of subscribers to a firm's network, the firm's market share can easily be derived by dividing through the total number of active users at a particular point in time.
The Models
In order to investigate the impact of the number of incumbents and the penetration rate on the development of market shares of entrants, we have investigated two types of models: (i) a series of static models and (ii) a dynamic model. We have carried out these static analyses at different moments in time to get an idea of the development over time: 1, 2 and 3 months after introduction, and then 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months after introduction.
The linear model we use is as follows: 9 In the dynamic analysis we also include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as an explanatory variable.
In the static analysis this additional variable did not produce statistically significant results. The dynamic analysis attempts to explain the course of development of the market share over the time a firm is present in the market place. To understand the model used, it is useful to reconsider the data presented in the previous section (Figure 2 ). Figure 2 shows that the market shares do not increase linearly over time. Instead, market shares first increase more rapidly (in the first months after market introduction). Subsequently, the increase in market share slows down and after some time a more or less stable market share is reached. To capture this aspect of the development in the empirical analysis we propose a non-linear model in the spirit of Kalyanaram and Urban (1992) . In such a model two parameters are crucial: the ultimate level the market share finally reaches and the speed with which the market share converges to this level. The model below is one of the simplest mathematical expressions that captures these two aspects: ), 1 ( We have chosen an exponential functional form for γ to assure it is always positive.
We also introduced both the penetration rate itself as the penetration rate squared. One would expect a negative relationship between market penetration rate at the moment of entry and ultimate market share. The relationship may, however, be non-linear, as the size of this negative relationship may become much stronger when market penetration rate is already quite large at the moment of entry. Moreover, it may be that there is an optimal moment (read: optimal penetration rate) to enter the market.
This may be the case when α 2 is negative and α 1 is positive. The country dummy measures the fact that the institutional environment may make market entry much easier in one country than in another.
For β we have chosen the following specification: in that month grows. Finally, we introduce country dummies to measure country specific differences, most notably the impact the national regulators have in protecting the interests of entrants. In the next section we will estimate the size of these effects on the basis of the data.
Analysis
In the first two subsections of this section we discuss the empirical results we obtained from estimating the two alternative models. The last subsection discusses in detail the question whether a potential simultaneity issue is hidden in the analysis. In particular, it may be that changes in market penetration not only determine the growth in market share of an entrant, but also that the very fact that a new party enters the market may have a positive impact on changes in market penetration. As we do not have enough data on other potentially relevant variables, we cannot estimate a simultaneous model where the mutual dependence is modeled. The last subsection therefore discusses an instrumental variable method to deal with this issue.
Analysis of the static models
We start the analysis by estimating the parameters of the static models at different durations after entry. The results are given in the "OLS column" of the There are some important results that attract the attention. First, all the estimated parameters have the expected signs: changes in the penetration rate have a positive impact, while the number of incumbents has a negative impact on the relative number of consumers an entrant is able to attract. More incumbents imply more competitors and therefore a smaller share of consumers choosing for the entrant. On the other hand, it is much easier to attract consumers who are choosing their first mobile phone operator than inducing consumers to switch operators. Therefore, when many new consumers are entering the market it is easier to gain market share than when the change in penetration rate is low. Almost all parameter estimates are significantly different from zero and, although the model is relatively simple and it was not possible to include an important factor such as price (due to non-availability of data), the model is able to explain a large fraction (between 50 and 60% for the analysis from 6 months onwards) of the fluctuations in the data.
Most striking is that the parameter values increase with the time span considered after entry. Right after entry an entrant is on average able to get 4% of the new consumers, while two years after entry an average entrant is able to get more than 25% of the new consumers who have started to use mobile telephones since the date of entry. This increase in the ability to attract new users can be explained by referring to two factors.
First, entrants usually need some time to build up a complete network with a nationwide coverage. In the beginning of their existence, they therefore do not offer the same quality and during this period consumers will prefer one of the incumbent operators that already have an optimal coverage. A second reason may be that also for entrants it is important to build up reputation, which simply takes time. We do not find evidence of a "shock therapy", according to which entrants have to attract their costumers in the first months after entry.
The impact of the number of incumbents grows from a negligible number to an effect of a 3% reduction for each additional incumbent. This means that other things being equal the difference in ability to attracting new clients between a first entrant (2 nd player in the market) and a third entrant (4 th player in the market) is just 6%. Of course, another important difference between the first and third entrant is the fact that the penetration rate at the moment of market entry is higher for the third entrant.
Given the estimations on the impact of changes in penetration rate, we conclude that the change in the penetration rate is more important than the number of incumbents in the market.
Analysis of the dynamic models
The estimates of the dynamic model give additional insight in the development of market shares. The results are reported in Table 2 below. Table 2 .
Estimation results for the dynamic model
We first look at the variables that explain the level to which the market shares eventually converge. A first striking factor is that the impact of the penetration rate is highly non-linear. There is very little difference between entering the market when the penetration rate is 10 or when it is 20%. However, when the penetration rate becomes quite large, the ultimate market share to be reached is very small. This follows from the large negative estimated impact (-2.35) of the squared penetration rate and the relatively low estimated impact (-0.3) of the penetration rate itself. To get some idea of the impact of the penetration rate on the ultimate market share compare (ceteris paribus) two situations, the first being a situation where a firm enters when the penetration rate is 10%, the other when it is 70%. 12 In the first situation the entrant will get an estimated ultimate market share of 19.8%, whereas it will only reach a market share of 5.3% in the second situation.
A second important fact is that the market concentration measure (HHI) is positive and highly significant vindicating the idea that it is much easier to enter and gain market share in a highly concentrated market than when there are a few firms competing with each other. To get an idea of the size of this effect compare again (ceteris paribus) two situations. In the first situation a firm enters when there is one incumbent firms and the HHI is 1, the second where there are already 3 active parties and the HHI is 0.4. 13 The estimated ultimate market share in the first case is 34%, whereas it is just 15.4% in the second case Austria, Ireland and Portugal) with a country dummy of -1.8 and a country (such as Sweden) with a country dummy of -2.6. A firm that enters these countries at the same point in time, e.g., when the penetration rate is 30% and the HHI is 0.4, gets an ultimate market share of 20.8%, respectively 9.3%.
Concerning the speed of convergence, it is interesting to observe that the HerfindahlHirschman Index is not significant. Apparently, besides its important impact on the ultimate market share, this index does not play a significant role in determining the speed of convergence. All other estimated parameters have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero.
12 Assume an average country (dummy constant -2.1) and the HHI being 0.4. 13 Assume an average country (dummy constant -2.1) and the penetration rate being 30% in both cases. 14 The estimate for Greece may be so low because of the special case of Cosmote discussed above.
Another way to interpret the results is by simulating the development of market shares over time in a controlled situation. Figure 3 below considers a country where a first entrant enters the market when the penetration rate is 5%, a second entrant enters when the penetration rate is 22% and the HHI is 0.58, a third entrant enters when the penetration rate is 40% and the HHI is 0.38 and a fourth entrant enters when the penetration rate is 53% and the HHI is 0.29. The moment of entry of the respective parties can be read from the figure. One can easily see from the figure that the first entrant is still able to gain quite a large market share and in the long run approach the market share of the incumbent. Later entrants, however, stay at much lower market shares. 
Corrected estimates in case of endogeneity
We finally address the possibility of endogeneity between the changes in the penetration rate and the growth of market share of entrants. 15 If endogeneity is present the error term of the equation is not independent of the value of the penetration rate anymore. Without correcting for endogeneity the estimated parameters, especially the one measuring the effect of the change in penetration rate, may be biased. A method to deal with (possible) endogeneity is to build a system of equations, one for the market share and one for the penetration rate, and estimate its parameters simultaneously. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data about other potentially relevant variables, it is impossible to build such a system of equations and estimate its parameters. Given our data set, this inevitably would lead to identification problems of parameters.
Another method to correct for possible endogeneity is to use an Instrumental Variable (IV) method. 16 If the change in the penetration rate is truly exogenous the OLSestimator is unbiased and efficient. Although the IV-estimator is then also unbiased it is less efficient. If, however, endogeneity is a problem the OLS-estimator is no longer unbiased, while the IV-estimator remains unbiased. Based on two such estimators, where one estimator is unbiased and asymptotically efficient under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, but biased and inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis of endogeneity, and the other estimator is consistent both under the null and the alternative hypotheses, Hausman (1978) suggests a simple test on endogeneity. The test exploits that if the regression equation is extended to include one additional variable that represents the projection of the potential endogenous change in penetration rate on its instruments an (OLS) estimator of the coefficient of this extra variable will be equal to zero if the penetration rate is exogenous. A test on endogeneity is, therefore, a student's t-test on the significance of this extra variable.
As an instrument/proxy for the (possible) endogenous change in the penetration rate in country X where a new introduction has taken place we used the average change in penetration rates in other countries from the moment the penetration rate is equal to the penetration rate in country X. Table 1 reports the results in the "IV column". It appears that the IV-estimates are different from the OLS-estimates for the first few months, but not for later months.
The last column of the table gives the Hausman t-values of the coefficient of the extra variable. As all the Hausman t-values are below 2 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, implying that although the IV-estimates for the effect of a change in penetration rate seem to differ in the first 3 months after entry, the Hausman test does not reject the exogeneity of the change in penetration rate for these times. We conclude that endogeneity is not an issue. As the OLS-estimates are unbiased and efficient in this case, these estimated values seem to be the most reliable. As endogeneity in the sense of this Section does not seem to be a problem, we do not have to adjust our dynamic analysis either.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed empirically to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and
early mover entrants. To analyze this question we have considered a series of static models and a dynamic model of market share development. In each of the static models, we have regressed the percentage of new users an entrant is able to acquire on the number of incumbents at the moment of entry and the change in penetration rate from the moment of entry onwards. We find strong evidence for early mover advantage. The advantage is, however, mainly caused by the influence of the penetration rate: it pays to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile telephone. In the dynamic model, we explain the market share in each month by factors such as changes in the penetration rate, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of entry and a country dummy. All variables that explain the ultimate market are highly significant. As expected it is significantly easier to enter (i) when the penetration rate is still quite low and (ii) in a highly concentrated industry. We also find important differences between countries possibly indicating the relative strength of the national regulators. It is, for example, relatively difficult to enter the mobile telephony sector and gain market share in the Scandinavian countries. We also provide indications for the size of the different effects. Depending on the specific conditions of entry, it seems fair to conclude that the first entrant may still gain a large market share, but that subsequent entrants have much more difficulties gaining market share. 
